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WAIVER OF THE MISSOURI DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION

The common law excluded as incompetent to testify all parties to a
lawsuit or others who were shown to have a direct pecuniary or proprietary interest in the outcome of the litigation.' It was believed that testimony
given by these persons was likely to be unreliable and that the proper safeguard was a general disqualification of all such interested witnesses. 2 This
disqualification often excluded the testimony of the only persons having
first-hand knowledge of the relevant facts.
By the middle of the 19th century, dissatisfaction with the common law3
disqualification had grown to the point that legislative reform began.
During this period Missouri abolished its common law disqualification for
interest.4 Missouri's reform statute, however, retained a remnant of the disqualification: No person is disqualified as a witness because of his interest
except that, where one of the original parties to a transaction is dead or
insane, the testimony of the interested, surviving party is excluded. Although
several rationales have been advanced to justify this "dead man's" exception,0
authorities have generally been critical.7 Despite these criticisms, the Dead
Man's Statute has been a feature of Missouri law since 1865.8

1. 3 B. JONES, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 762 (1958). The nature of the
disqualifying interest had to be such that the witness would either gain or lose
by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment, or that the record would
be legal evidence for or against him in another action. The interest could not be
remote or contingent, but had to be a present vested interest. It also had to be a
legal interest as distinguished from bias arising from consanguinity or social
relationships. See 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE §§ 386, 390 (14th ed. 1883), cited

with approval in Wagner v. Binder, 187 S.W. 1128, 1152-53 (Mo. 1916). See
Comment, The "Dead Man's Statute" in Missouri, 23 WAsr. U.L.Q. 343 (1938).
2. See 2 J. WIGMorE, EVIDENCE § 576 (3rd ed. 1940). There were exceptions to this common law disqualification. See 3 B. JONEs, supra note 1, § 765.
Based on public necessity and convenience, certain persons were allowed to testify
regardless of their interest. See 1 S. GREENLEAF, supra note 1, §§ 411, 416.
Exceptions to the disqualification included: (1) An agent could testify to prove
acts done in the scope of his employment; (2) witnesses could testify in criminal
cases even though they were entitled to a reward upon conviction of the offender;
(3) a party who suffered loss of goods through fraud could testify to the loss
when no other evidence of the loss existed; and (4) witnesses could testify to
establish the loss of written documents. See Comment, supra note 1.
3. See 2 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 2, § 577.
4. Ch. 144, § 1, RSMo 1866.
5. § 491.010, RSMo 1969.
6. The rationales that have been advanced are: 1) To protect estates from
claims created through perjured testimony, 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 578; 2)
to place the parties in substantial equality-if the lips of one of the original parties
to a contract or cause of action are sealed by death, the law closes the mouth of
the other, In re Trautmanns Estate, 300 Mo. 314, 322, 254 S.W. 286, 288
(1923); 3) to eliminate any incentive to delay litigation in hope that one party
will die and leave the survivor's testimony uncontradicted, Comment, The "Dead
Man's Statute" in Missouri,23 WA.H. U.L.Q. 848, 345 (1938).
7. 2 J. WIGMORE, supranote 2, § 578.
8. Ch. 144, § 1, RSMo 1866. Many American jurisdictions have similar dead
man's provisions. These statutes take various forms and are subject to different
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The Missouri Dead Man's Statute has been the subject of much litigation and judicial construction. The statute has not, however, always been
construed from the same perspective. Some courts have strictly adhered to
the statutory language; 9 others have been more mindful of the purpose
underlying the act.10 The Dead Man's Statute is further complicated by
a judicially-created doctrine of waiver. Where the protected party'1 makes a
proper objection, the statute will exclude the testimony of a witness who falls
within its disqualification. But should the protected party either fail to make
a proper objection,'12 or compel the disqualified witness to disclose parts
of his testimony during discovery' 3 or at trial,' 4 the disqualification is
waived, and the witness is competent to testify. A waiver does not require
that the protected party actually intend to waive the witness' incompetency
under the statute; it is enough that the protected party acts or fails to act
in a manner to constitute a waiver.' 5
This comment will discuss what constitutes waiver of the Dead Man's
Statute.' 6 First, however, the basic operation of the statute will be explained.
IL

OPERATON OF THE DEAD MAN's STATuTE

A. Text of the Statute
To aid analysis, the statute may be divided into three functional parts:
COMMON LAW
No person shall be disqualified
DISQUALIFICATION-FOR-INTEREST as a witness in any civil suit or
RULE CHANGED
proceeding at law or in equity,
by reason of his interest in the
event of the same as a party or
otherwise, but such interest may
be shown for the purpose of
affecting his credibility,

constructions. For this reason they have limited value as precedent in Missouri
cases.
9. See, e.g., Poague v. Mallory, 208 Mo. App. 395, 235 S.W. 491 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1921).
10. The purpose of the statute is to place the parties, as nearly as possible,
on an equality in producing testimony. Ess v. Griffith, 139 Mo. 322, 329, 40 S.W.
930, 931 (1897). See also Freeman v. Berberich, 322 Mo. 831, 60 S.W.2d 393
(1933).

11. The protected party is one with standing to object to a witness' com-

petency under the statute. In contract cases, the protected party is the decedent's

estate, the party claiming under him, or the principal of a deceased agent. In tort

cases, the protected party is the decedents estate. Successors in interest to the
decedent may be protected parties. Thus, the assignee of a contract can invoke
the same protection that would have been afforded his assignor's executor or

administrator. Lambert v. Rodier, 194 S.W.2d 934 (K.C. Mo. App. 1946). See
Mo. BAR

.L.E., Sources of Proof, at 169-70 (1961).

12. See pt. III, § E(1) of this comment.
13. See pt. III, § C of this comment.
14. See pt. III, § E of this comment.

15. See, e.g., Prentzler v. Schneider, 411 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. En Bane 1966).
16. § 491.010, RSMo 1969.
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provided, that in actions where
one of the original parties to the
contract or cause of action in
issue and on trial is dead, or is
shown to the court to be insane,
the other party to such contract
or cause of action shall not be
admitted to testify either in his
own favor or in favor of any
party to the action claiming
under him, and no party to such
suit or proceeding whose right
of action or defense is derived
to him from one who is, or if
living would be, subject to the
foregoing disqualification, shall
be admitted to testify in his own
favor, except as in this section
is provided,

ADMINISTRATION PROVISO

and where an executor or administrator is a party, the other party
shall not be admitted to testify
in his own favor, unless the contract in issue was originally made
with a person who is living and
competent to testify, except as to
such acts and contracts as have
been done or made since the
probate of the will or the
appointment of the administrator; provided further, that in
actions for the recovery of any
sum or balance due on account,
and when the matter at issue
and on trial is proper matter of
book, the party living may be a
witness in his own favor so far
as to prove in whose handwriting
his charges are, and when made,
and no farther.
The first section abolishes the common law disqualification for interest. 17
The transactions proviso contains the dead man's exception. The administration proviso is the dead man's exception applied to the special case where
an executor or administrator is a party to the lawsuit.

17. See notes 1, 2 and accompanying text supra.
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B. Transactions Proviso
The transactions proviso applies where one of the original parties to a
contract or, cause of action "in issue and on trial"' 8 is dead or insane. 19 By its
20
own terms, the proviso applies to tort as well as contract causes of action.
In contract actions, the statutory term "party to the contract" has been
iri.rprete.d to mean the negotiator of the contract, not the person in whose

name and interest the contract is made. 21 If the contract was negotiated

through an agent, the death of the agent bars the testimony of the opposing

negotiating party, even though the principal for whose benefit the contract
was inade is still living.22 The death of the other negotiating party, on the
other hand, does not bar the testimony of the agent.23 In Bernblum v.
Travelers Insurance Co., 24 the defendant's agent was permitted to testify
concerning the sale of an insurance policy even though the purchaser who
had negotiated the insurance contract had died prior to trial. The court
held that the purpose of the statute was to make competent certain witnesses
who would have been incompetent at common law, not to add further
disquialifications.2-5 Thus, the agent, competent to testify under an exception

18. A contract or cause of action is in issue and on trial at any occasion it
is called into question. See, e.g., Chapman v. Dougherty, 87 Mo. 617 (1885),
where, in an ejectment action, plaintiff claimed title to certain land as the devisee
of defendant's grantee. The defense was nondelivery of the deed. The plaintiff
contended that defendant-grantor was barred under the transactions proviso from
testifying concerning his dealing with his deceased grantee. The defendant argued
that for the purposes of the statute, the only cause of action in issue and on trial
was defendant's alleged unlawful withholding of possession; the delivery of the
deed was therefore not the basic controversy and, hence, the statutory disqualification was inapplicable. The court held that the defendant was incompetent to
testify concerning the delivery of the deed, reasoning that since the validity of the
deed was called into question, its delivery was also. See also Timmonds v. Wilbur,
260 S.W. 1004 (Mo. 1924) (contract assigning cause of action to the plaintiff not
in issue and on trial).
19. The statute requires that a party's insanity be shown to the court.
Because the aim of the statute is to prevent one party's testimony from being
uncontradicted as a result of the death or insanity of the opposing party, it should
follow that a party would not be considered insane for the purposes of the statute
unless he is incompetent to testify. The trial court must make the determination
of incompetency; a prior adjudication of insanity creates only a prima facie
presumption of incompetency which may be rebutted by voir dire examination or
other means. Beil v. Gaertner, 355 Mo. 617, 197 S.W.2d 611 (1946). See also
Martin v. Norton, 497 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. 1973). To be competent as a witness, it is
necessary only that the party understand the nature of the oath and possess the
mental capacity sufficient to observe, remember, and narrate the things he heard
or saw. State v. Herring, 268 Mo. 514, 188 S.W. 169 (1916); Dennis v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 461 S.W.2d 325 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970).
20. See, e.g., Freeman v. Berberich, 382 Mo. 831, 60 S.W.2d 393 (1938).
21. Edmonds v. Scharff, 279 Mo. 78, 213 S.W. 823 (1919).
22. Williams v. Edwards, 94 Mo. 447, 7 S.W. 429 (1888). But where one
side of a contract is represented by two or more negotiators, the death of one of
them will not disqualify the other party to the contract. Jones v. DeWitt, 499
S.W.2d 524 (Mo. 1973).
23. Bernblum v. Travelers Ins. Co., 340 Mo. 1217, 1227, 105 S.W.2d 941,
945 (En Banc 1987).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1227, 105 S.W.2d at 945.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/6
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at common law, 26 remained competent despite the death of the other
27
contracting party.
The transactions proviso is subject to a different construction in tort
actions. As in contract actions, the agent-employee is competent to testify
28
despite the death of the other party to the tortious transaction at issue.
Unlike contract actions, however, the death of the agent-employee who
caused the plaintiffs injury does not disqualify the plaintiff in his suit
against the employer. 29 In Freemanv. Berberch,30 plaintiff sued for damages
for personal injuries sustained when the automobile in which he was riding
collided with defendant Berberich's truck. Berberich's employee, who had
been driving the truck, died prior to trial. Berberich moved to exclude
portions of plaintiffs testimony contending that plaintiff was incompetent
to testify about the accident because his employee, the actual participant
in the transaction at issue, was dead. Had he lived, Berberich argued, the
employee could have contradicted plaintiff's testimony concerning the accident. 31 In allowing plaintiff to testify, the court distinguished the masterservant relationship in a tort case from that of principal and agent in a
contract case. Based on that distinction, the court found no reason to apply
the statute in tort actions for personal injuries except to the actual parties to
the cause of action at issue and on trial. 32 Because the deceased employee's
estate was not a party to the lawsuit, plaintiff was a competent witness.3
One of the original parties to the contract or the cause of action at
issue must be dead or insane before the statute operates. In contract cases,

26. See note 2 supra.
27. Bernblum v. Travelers Ins. Co., 340 Mo. 1217, 1226-27, 105 S.W.2d 941,
945 (En Bane 1937).
28. Wagner v. Binder, 187 S.W. 1128 (Mo. 1916).
29. Freeman v. Berberich, 332 Mo. 831, 60 S.W.2d 393 (1933).
30. Id.
31. This is a necessary requirement for disqualification of the survivor under
the transactions proviso. See text accompanying note 43 infra.
32. Freeman v. Berberich, 332 Mo. 831, 60 S.W.2d 393 (1933).
The essential distinction is that the agent is employed to establish
contractual relations between his principal and third persons, while the
servant is not....
Moreover, it is apparent that the duties of a contracting agent to bring about contractual relations necessarily involve
secrecy, and that therefore no one, except he who conducts the negotiations, will usually be in a position to know anything about the transaction. ... In the case of an alleged verbal contract, there is nothing
visible which will contradict or corroborate. On the other hand, the
negligent or wrongful actions of a servant in the scope of his employment, for which a master may be held responsible for personal injuries
occasioned to a third party, are usually open for all the world to see.
Id. at 847, 60 S.W.2d at 401.
38. Had plaintiff sued the estate of the employee who caused his injury,
plaintiff's testimony would have been excludable under the transactions proviso.
Had plaintiff sued both the employer and the estate of the employee, plaintiff
would have been competent to testify against the employer, but incompetent to
give the same testimony against the employee's estate. In this situation, plaintiff
would be allowed to give his complete testimony, but the employee's estate would
be entitled to a limiting instruction to the effect that plaintiff's testimony could
be considered only against the employer. Grimm v. Gargis, 803 S.W.2d 43
(Mo. 1957).
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an original party is one who negotiated the contract; 34 in tort cases, he is
one who is, or whose estate is, a party to the lawsuit.35 For example, a
wrongful death iaction does not automatically involve the Dead Man's
Statute.36 Under Missouri law, the spouse or heir does not derive his cause
of action from the deceased, and the deceased or his estate is not a party
to the cause of action.37 As a consequence, both parties to the lawsuit may
be living, and therefore, the statute is inapplicable. 38 If the defendant in
the wrongful death action is dead or insane, however, the statute is applicable. Thus where the action is brought against the tort-feasor's estate, the
statute bars the survivor's testimony.39
A witness need not be a party of record to be disqualified under the
transactions proviso. If the survivor is a real party in interest to the transaction in issue and on trial, he is disqualified even though he is not a
named party.40 Although the survivor totally relinquishes his interest, he
41
remains incompetent to testify in favor of any party claiming under him.
To illustrate, assume that A negotiates a contract with B, then assigns his
rights under that contract to C. B then dies and C later sues on the contract. A will be incompetent to testify in favor of C concerning his negotiations with B. In addition, C will also be disqualified from testifying
concerning A's dealings with B, because the statute excludes the testimony
of any party whose right of action or defense is derived to him from one
who is, or if living would be, disqualified. Similarly, the heirs of a deceased
grantee are incompetent under the statute to testify concerning the delivery
of a deed to the grantee if the grantor is dead at the time of trial.42 Had he
,lived, the grantee would have been barred, so the persons claiming through
him are also barred.
The transactions proviso does not bar all testimony by the survivor.
The survivor is incompetent only as to those matters on which the decedent
could have testified had he lived.43 Hence, a plaintiff in a suit for personal
injuries against the decedent's estate is incompetent to testify as to how
the accident occurred where the decedent would have been able to testify
about the accident had he survived. The same plaintiff is competent, how84. Edmonds v. Scharff, 279 Mo. 78, 213 S.W. 823 (1919).
35. Freeman v. Berberich, 322, Mo. 831, 847, 60 S.W.2d 393, 401 (1933).

86. See, e.g., Myers v. Griffith, 495 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1978); State ex rel.

Thomas v. Daues, 314 Mo. 13, 283 S.W. 51 (En Banc 1926).

87. Myers v. Griffith, 495 S.W.2d 447, 447 (Mo. 1973).

38. Cases cited note 86 supra.
39. Prentzler v. Schneider, 411 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. En Banc 1966).

40. In Meier v. Thieman, 90 Mo. 433, 2 S.W. 435 (1886), a widow sued
defendant for rent. The defense was payment to A. A testified that he was entitled

to the rent because he had purchased the rental property from the widow's
deceased husband. Held: A was incompetent under the transactions proviso to
testify concerning his dealings with the deceased husband because, although not
a named party, he was the real party in interest to the cause of action in issue

and on trial.

41. Bussen v. Del Commune, 289 Mo. App. 859, 199 S.W.2d 13 (St. L.

Ct. App. 1947).

42. Messimer v. McCrary, 113 Mo. 382, 21 S.W. 17 (1893). See also Baker
v. Baker, 363 Mo. 318,251 S.W.2d 31 (1952).
43. Weiermueller v. Scullen, 203 Mo. 466, 101 S.W. 1088 (En Banc 1907).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/6
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ever, to testify concerning his injuries because the decedent, had he lived,
would not have had personal knowledge concerning plaintiffs injuries, and
therefore would have been unable to contradict the plaintiff on that subject.
C. Administration Proviso
The administration proviso applies to lawsuits in which an- executor or
administrator is a party. This proviso is specifically limited fo ad ions in
contract; actions in tort are determined solely by the transactinfs proviso.44
When applicable, the administration proviso excludes all testimony by
the survivor except as to acts and contracts which occurted subsequent to
the probate of the will or the appointment of the administrator.40, Unlike
the transactions proviso, incompetency under the administration"proviso is
absolute-there is no requirement that the decedent would' -have been
able, had he lived, to contradict the survivor's testimony.46 In Kersey v.
O'Day,47 defendant administrator's witnesses testified to a conversation
with the plaintiff that had occurred prior to the appointment of the administrator. Even though the decedent had not been a participant in those conversations, the plaintiff was held incompetent to deny the conversations
because they occurred prior to the appointment of the administrator. The
administration proviso has been criticized as being arbitrary and unfair,48
but the courts have considered themselves bound by the express language
49
of the statute which results in this construction.
III. WAIVR OF Tim DEAD MAN's STATUTrE

A. Introduction
The Dead Man's Statute prevents the survivor of a transaction with a
decedent from testifying in his own favor. The statute does not, however,
bar the survivor from testifying on behalf of the protected party.5 0 The
protected party may choose to ignore the disqualification and make the

44. Fellows v. Farmer, 879 S.W.2d 842 (Spr. Mo. App. 1964).
45. Davis v. Robb, 10 S.W.2d 680 (Spr. Mo. App. '1928).
46. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
47. 173 Mo. 560, 73 S.W. 481 (1903).

48. The court in Kersey v. O'Day, 173 Mo. 560, 73 S.W. 481 (1903); stated:
[I] t is difficult to see the reason of this strict rule. What difference
does it make whether the conversation was before or after the grant of

letters of administration? The dead man is no party to the conversations.

If he had been living, and was not present at the conversation, he

would not be able to say anything about it. It strikes me, as 'tithese
conversations, separate and independent from any transaction with the
deceased, to permit the living witnesses to give their version of the

conversations and then exclude the living party from giving his, is
directly in conflict with the spirit of the statute, 'of placing all parties

on an equal footing.
Id. at 570, 73 S.W. at 484.
49. See, e.g., Schwalbert v. Konert, 230 Mo. App. 811, 75 S.W.2d 445
(St. L. Ct. App. 1934).
50. Jackson v. Smith, 139 Mo. App. 691, 123 S.W. 1026 (K.C. Ct. App.
1910).
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survivor his own witness, although doing so waives the statute and makes
the survivor competent to testify in his own behalf.51 This waiver option,
therefore, gives the protected party the ability'to bar the survivor's testimony
when it is' unfavorable to the protected party; and to' compel it if it is
favorable.52 The survivor, on the other hand, cannot affect his competency
54
53
by his own actions; only !he protected party can invoke or waive
the'statute.
A waiver can occur in various ways. Failure to make a proper objection
to the, survivor's proffered testimony constitutes a waiver.5 5 The survivor
is not obliged to inform the court of his incompetency 56 Waiver can occur
during the discovery process, 57 at trial through direct5" or cross-examination,59 or through use of the survivor's testimony from a prior trial. 60 A
waiver as to one incompetent witness waives the incompetency of other
witnesses having similar knowledge who are subject to the same statutory
disqualification.' These subjects are discussed below.

B. Testimony Of The Decedent Preserved
Where the testimony of the deceased party has been preserved in a
form that can be used at trial, the surviving party is competent to testify
in his own behalf on matters covered by the preserved testimony.62 This
rule puts the parties in an equal position and is in accordance with the
purposes- of the statute.63 The survivor is competent even though the
decedents representative does not offer the preserved testimony as evidence. 64 The survivor, however, must show that the decedent's testimony
has been preserved.6 5
The deceased's testimony may be preserved in the form of a depositiofi. 6 The deposition can be one taken in a prior suit or in connection with

51. In re Trautmann's Estate, 300 Mo. 314, 254 S.W. 286 (1923).
52. Jackson v. Smith, 139 Mo. App. 691, 128 S.W. 1026 (K.C. Ct. App.
1910).
53. Dolan v. Kehr, 9 Mo. App. 851 (St. L. Ct. App. 1880).
54. State ex rel. State Highway Commn v. Jacobs, 281 S.W.2d 597 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1955). But where a waiver does occur, it is the survivor's responsibility
to call it to the courts attention. Tomlinson v. Ellison, 104 Mo. 105, 16 S.W.
201 (1891); Norton v. Lynds, 24 S.W.2d 183 (K.C. Mo. App. 1930).
55. See notes 118-137 and accompanying text infra.
56. Crutcher v. Kansas City Viaduct & Terminal Ry., 181 Mo. App. 368,
168 S.W. 826 (K.C. Ct. App. 1914).
57.- See text accompanying notes 78-103 infra.
58. See text accompanying notes 144-151 infra.
59. See text accompanying notes 138-143 infra.
60. See text accompanying notes 152-164 infra.
61. Martin v. Norton, 497 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. 1973); Baker v. Baker, 363 Mo.
318, 251 S.W.2d 31 (1952); Fowler v. Sone', 226 S.W. 995 (K.C. Mo. App. 1920).
62. Allen v. Chouteau, 102 Mo. 309, 14 S.W. 869 (1890).
63. Stone v. Hunt, 114 Mo. 66, 71, 21 S.W. 454, 455 (1893).
64. Leahy v. Rayburn, 33 Mo. App. 55 (St. L. Ct. App. 1888).
65. McCracken v. Schuster, 179 S.W. 757, 759 (K.C. Mo. App. 1915).
66. In Allen v. Chouteau, 102 Mo. 309, 14 S.W. 869 (1890), Allen's executor
sued for a debt allegedly owed by Chouteau to the estate of Allen. Allen's
deposition, taken in connection with a prior suit between Allen and Chouteau,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/6
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the instant controversy. 67 An attorney may insure his own client's competency
to testify by taking the deposition of the other party. Once the opposing
party's testimony is preserved in the form of a deposition, his death will
not result in the Dead Man's Statute disqualification of the survivor. Care
should be taken that the deposition is complete, however, as the statutory
disqualification applies to matters not covered by the deposition. 8
Testimony may also be preserved in a record of the proceedings from
a prior trial.69 The statute does not exclude the survivor's testimony on
subjects contained within the decedents recorded testimony.70 Normally
the record preserves the survivor's prior testimony as well as that of the
deceased. The survivor, however, is not bound by his prior statements in
the record and may correct errors therein.71 Inconsistent
prior testimony is,
72
however, available for impeachment purposes.
Testimony of the deceased was preserved in a letter in Galvin v. Knights
of FatherMathew.73 The plaintiff sued to recover death benefits under an
insurance policy containing a forfeiture clause which required the insured
to abstain from drinking alcoholic beverages. The issue was whether the
defendant's agent had waived the forfeiture clause by accepting premiums
with full knowledge that the insured drank in violation of the policy. The
agent was dead at the time of trial. Over defendant's objection, plaintiff
testified to her conversations with the agent which tended to show that the
forfeiture clause had been waived.7 4 The defendant subsequently introduced
in evidence a letter written by the agent in which the agent stated that he
had no knowledge that the insured drank. On appeal, the court held that
the agent's testimony was preserved in the letter and that the plaintiff was
75
therefore competent to testify concerning her dealings with the agent.
In initially admitting plaintiff's testimony, the lower court in Galvin
committed reversible error. The plaintiff was incompetent under the transactions proviso to testify as to her conversations with the agent, the deceased
agent having been the negotiating party to the insurance contract at issue

was introduced in evidence. The court held Chouteau competent to testify concerning matters covered by the deposition. As to matters not contained in the
deposition, however, the administration proviso was applicable and Chouteau
was incompetent.

.67. Drummond Realty & Inv. Co. v. W. H. Thompson Trust Co., 178 S.W.

479 (Mo. 1915); Wolfson v. Chelist, 278 S.W.2d 39 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955);
Vigeant v. Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 239 Mo. App. 46, 188 S.W.2d 533
(K.C. Ct. App. 1945); Knickerbocker v. Athletic Tea Co., 285 S.W. 797 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1926); Ferry v. Woody, 210 Mo. App. 98, 241 S.W. 78 (K.C. Ct. App.

1922); Carpenter v. Gruendler Mach. Co., 162 Mo. App. 296, 141 S.W. 1147
(St. L. Ct. App. 1911); Leahy v. Rayburn, 83 Mo. App. 55 (St. L. Mo. App.
1888).
68. Cases cited note 67 supra.
69. Stone v. Hunt, 114 Mo. 66, 21 S.W. 454 (1893); Coughlin v. Haeussler,

50 Mo. 126 (1872); McCracken v. Schuster, 179 S.W. 757 (K.C. Mo. App. 1915).
70. Cases cited note 69 supra.

71. Stone v. Hunt, 114 Mo. 66, 21 S.W. 454 (1893).
72. Id.
78. 169 Mo. App. 496, 155 S.W. 45 (K.C. Mo. App. 1913).

74. Id. at 502, 155 S.W. at 47.
75. Id. at 513, 155 S.W. at 51.
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and on trial. The subsequently admitted letter, however, embodied the
testimony the agent could have given had he lived, thus placing the parties
in substantially the same position as if the agent had survived. Because the
objective of the statute had been achieved, the "spirit of the statute did not
require that the lower court be reversed over the admission of the plaintiff's
testimony".70 Galvin may stand for the proposition that whenever the protected party offers the decedent's out-of-court statement in evidence, the
survivor is competent to testify concerning the
subject matter of that state77
ment. Galvin's import, however, is uncertain.

C. Waiver During Discovery7"
1. Depositions and Interrogatories
The protected party waives the statutory incompetency of the survivor
by taking his deposition on subjects on which the survivor is incompetent to
testify.7 9 This waiver makes the survivor a competent witness for all
purposes;80 he may testify as to all facts within his knowledge.81 Furthermore, the waiver extends to all other witnesses having like knowledge whose
testimony is subject to the same disqualification. 82 The rationale for this
waiver is that, after permitting discovery of the survivor's testimony, it
would not be equitable to allow the protected party to invoke the statute
to exclude it if it is unfavorable.1 In accordance with this rationale, the
statute is waived even though the deposition is not filed 4 or used at trial.85
The statute treats interrogatories in the same manner as depositions.8 0 Where
the service of interrogatories is a mandatory step in a procedure required by
law,8 7 however, their service does not waive the statute.88

76. Id. at 513, 155 S.W. at 51.
77. See also Hodge v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 261 S.W. 67 (Mo. 1924)
(survivor was not made competent by the admission into evidence of decedent's
checks and stubs from contract at issue).
78. The subject matter of this section should be distinguished from that of
the previous section. Pt. III, § B was concerned with situations in which the
decedent's testimony was preserved by deposition or other means. This section
deals with situations where the survivor's deposition is taken by the protected
party.
79. Tomlinson v. Ellison, 104 Mo. 105, 16 S.W. 201 (1891).
80. Borgess Inv. Co. v. Vette, 142 Mo. 560, 44 S.W. 754 (1898).
81. In re Trautmann's Estate, 800 Mo. 814, 323, 254 S.W. 286, 289 (1923).
82. Baker v. Baker, 863 Mo. 818, 328, 251 S.W.2d 31, 84 (1952).
83. Ess v. Griffith, 139 Mo. 822,40 S.W. 930 (1897).
84. Rice v. Waddill, 168 Mo. 99, 67 S.W. 605 (1902).
85. Ess v. Griffith, 189 Mo. 822,40 S.W. 980 (1897).
86. Watkins v. Watkdns, 897 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. 1965); Lehr v. Moll, 247
S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1952); Casserly v. Bench, 458 S.W.2d 893 (Spr. Mo. App.
1970).
87. See, e.g., Mo. Laws 1955, at 885, § 129 (repealed 1973) (probate court
discovery of assets provision).
88. Roger's Estate v. Courier, 429 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. 1968); Carmody v.
Carmody, 266 Mo. 556, 181 S.W. 1148 (1916); Tygard v. Falor, 163 Mo. 234,
63 S.W. 672 (1901). But direct examination in conjunction with mandatory
interrogatories will cause a waiver. In re Trautmann's Estate, 830 Mo. 314, 254

S.W. 286 (1923).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/6

10

Bishop: Bishop: Waiver of the Missouri
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

It is clear that if the deposition touches subjects on which the survivor
is incompetent to testify, the Dead Man's Statute is waived.89 Case law-is
uncertain, however, whether a waiver occurs when the deposition toudhes
only subject matters not excludable under the statute.90 In some decisien!,
courts have stressed that the deposition causing the waiver did touch matters
on which the survivor was incompetent to testify.91 But many cases,
including some recent ones, simply make the unqualified statement-that- the
taking of the survivor's deposition waives his incompetency, and do not
discuss the actual contents of the deposition in issue.92 The recent cdse of
Saupe v. Kertz93 may help resolve this uncertainty. Saupe was an action
against an administrator for personal injuries sustained when plaintiffs
truck collided with an automobile driven by the administrator's decedent.
Plaintiff contended that his incompetency under the Dead Man's Statute
was waived when the administrator moved for the production of plaintiffs
medical records. The court held that there was no waiver'b-ecause the information contained in the requested records was not excludable under the
Dead Man's Statute.9 4 Applying this reasoning to discovery depositions,

89. Boydston v. Bank of Camden Point, 141 S.W.2d 86 (K.C. Mo. App.
1940); Alexander v. Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World, 193 Mo. App.
411, 186 S.W. 2 (K.C. Ct. App. 1916); P.M. Bruner Granitoid Co. v. Glencoe
Lime & Cement Co., 187 S.W. 807 (St. L. Mo. App. 1916).
90. E.g., Borgess Inv. Co. v. Vette, 142 Mo. 560, 44 S.W. 754 (1898).
Borgess was a suit to enjoin the foreclosure of a deed of trust. Plaintiff's precessor
in title had executed a deed of trust to secure notes owed to F. Plaintiff claimed
that the deed of trust had been discharged by the trustee's release. The 'defendant claimed to be a bona fide purchaser having paid F valuable consideration
for the notes without notice of the release. When defendant attempted to testify
concerning his purchase of the note from F (who was deceased at the time of
trial), the plaintiff objected that the defendants testimony was barred undei the
transactions proviso. Defendant contended that-the statute had been waived:wben
the plaintiff took his deposition. Plaintiff replied that the deposition did not
constitute a waiver, because it did not touch on defendant's purchase of the note.
Evidence as to the contents of the deposition was in direct conflict, the defendant claiming that that the deposition did touch on that transaction. Although
the court found a waiver, it is difficult to determine whether the waiver vwds
based on the taking of the deposition alone or whether the court determined that
the deposition did cover matters excludable under the statute. Id. at 570-71, 44
S.W. at 756.
91. See cases note 90 supra.
92. Watkins v. Watkins, 397 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. 1965); Edwards v. Durham,
346 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1961); Baker v. Baker, 363 Mo. 318, 251 S.W.2d 31
(1952); Lehr v. Moll, 247 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1952); In re Squlards Estate, 141
Mo. 642, 43 S.W. 617 (1897); Melton v. Ensley, 421 S.W.2d 44 (Spr. Mo. App.
1967); National Life Ins. Co. v. Blair, 240 Mo. App. 982, 225 S.W.2d 806 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1920); Bush-"v.
Ct.
App.
Radke
Radke,
Block,
1931949);
Mo. App.
704,v.187
S.W.221
153 S.W.
(K.C.739
Ct. (K.C.
App. 1916).
App.,
D. St. L. 1974). A motion has been
filed 93.
for transfer S.W.2d
to the Missouri (Mo.
Supreme
Court.
. Saupe was a tort action, so the transactions prdviso applied.
94. Id. at
The transactions proviso disqualifies the survivor only as to matters which the
deceased could have testified bad he lived. In Saupe, the decedenf had no
knowledge of the survivor's medical history; therefore, the medical records-wei
not excludable under the statute. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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Saupe may indicate that the Dead Man's Statute is not waived by taking
the survivor's deposition on matters not excludable under the statute.
The holding in Saupe should apply to depositions. If the purpose of
the statute is to make the parties substantially equal in their ability to
produce evidence, 95 it logically follows that no waiver should occur unless
the deposition actually touches matters on which the survivor was incompetent to testify. Because the survivor is permitted to conduct discovery of
the protected party's competent witnesses, equality would seem to require
that the protected party also have the same privilege relative to the survivor's competent witnesses. If the survivor is competent to testify concerning a subject, the protected party needs to discover this testimony in order
to prepare his case. A holding contrary to Saupe would force the protected
party to choose between either waiving the statute, or not deposing the
survivor on testimony admissible at trial. Such a choice is inconsistent with
the purpose of the statute. The Dead Man's Statute was intended to protect
the representatives of the dead, not put them at a disadvantage.
2. Production of Documents for Inspection"
In Saupe v. Kertz,97 the court held that the protected party's motion
for the production and inspection of the survivor's documents did not waive
the Dead Man's Statute where the information contained in those documents
was not excludable under the statute.9s Although the holding in Saupe was
limited to its facts, Saupe might be interpreted to mean that the Dead Man's
Statute is waived where the requested documents do contain information
excludable under the statute.99 Such a waiver rule, however, would not be
consistent with the purpose of the Dead Man's Statute. A motion to
produce documents should not waive the Dead Man's Statute.
In Saupe, the survivor argued that the waiver rules applicable to a
deposition should also be applied to a motion for the production and
inspection of documents. 10 0 This is not a compelling argument. Although
both are forms of discovery, a deposition and a motion to produce documents
are distinguishable in that they discover different types of evidence. The
Dead Man's Statute does not bar all evidence offered by the survivor, it
only bars the survivor's testimony. In taking the survivor's deposition, the
protected party discovers his testimony. Because it would be unfair to allow
the protected party to discover the survivor's testimony and then exclude it,
taking the survivor's deposition waives the statute. A motion to produce

95. See note 6 supra.

96. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 58.01 (1974).
97.S.W.2d (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974). See note 98 and
accompanying text supra. A motion has been filed for transfer to the Missouri
Supreme Court.
98. Id. at
99. Such a waiver would probably make the survivor a competent witness for
all purposes. This would be consistent with waivers arising from the taking of
depositions. See notes 86 and 87 supra. The waiver would also extend to other
witnesses having like knowledge whose testimony is subject to the same disqualification. See cases note 61 supra.
100.

-

S.W.2d

-,

--
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documents, on the other hand, does not discover the survivor's testimony.
It discovers the survivor's documents, a form of evidence the protected party
cannot exclude under the statute. It would be anomalous if the Dead Man's
Statute could be waived by discovering a type of evidence which is not
excludable by the statute.
In addition, the waiver rule suggested by the Saupe decision is inconsistent with the purpose of the Dead Man's Statute.1' 1 Under this waiver
rule, if the protected party requests documents containing information
excludable under the statute, he waives the survivor's incompetency. In
most cases, however, the protected party will not know the exact contents
of those documents until the survivor produces them for inspection. The
protected party, thus, will be unable to discover the survivor's documents
without risking a waiver of the statute. Such a waiver rule would, therefore,
severely limit the protected party's discovery of the survivor's documents.
The survivor, on the other hand, would still be able to freely discover the
deceased's documents. As a result of the waiver rule, he would have an
advantage over the protected party in preparing his case for trial.10 2
The purpose of the Dead Man's Statute is to make the parties substantially equal in their ability to produce evidence. 0 3 Instead of putting the
parties on an equality, the waiver rule suggested by Saupe would give the
survivor a distinct advantage. For this reason, the waiver rule suggested
in Saupe should not be adopted. A motion to produce documents for inspection should not waive the Dead Man's Statute.
D. Waiver By Counterclaim
The recent case of Saupe v. Kertz 0 4 raises a question as to whether the
Dead Man's Statute is waived where the protected party counterclaims
against the survivor. In Saupe, the plaintiff sued an administrator for personal injuries sustained in a collision with an automobile driven by the
administrator's decedent. The administrator counterclaimed for the wrongful
death of his decedent, but the counterclaim was dismissed prior to trial
because the administrator was not the proper party to bring the wrongful
death action.' 0 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the administrator had
waived his incompetency by filing the counterclaim. Plaintiff relied upon a
California decision, Bruce v. Ullery, 0° which held that, where an admin-

101. See note 6 supra.

102. In addition, if the discovered documents are admissible in evidence
and preserve the deceased's testimony, the survivor is competent to testify on
the matters covered in the preserved testimony. See pt. III, § B of this comment.
103. See note 6 supra.
104. -

S.W.2d

,

(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974). A motion has been

filed for transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court.
105. Id. at _. The deceased was a childless, unmarried minor. Section
537.080, RSMo 1969, grants the right of recovery for wrongful death of a childless, unmarried minor to the deceased parents.
106. Bruce v. Ullery, 375 P.2d 833, 25 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1962). In dictum,
the court stated that it was not essential that the estate produced evidence;
merely filing the counterclaim waived the statute. Id. at 836, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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istrator introduces evidence to support his counterclaim against the survivor,
he waives the incompetency of all witnesses defending against the counterclaim. The Saupe court, however, distinguished Ullery on its facts and cited
Norgard v. Norgard,'07 a case holding that an administrator's counterclaim
does not waive the California Dead Man's statute if the counterclaim is
dismissed prior to trial. The Saupe court held that, because the counterclaim
was ruled improper and dismissed prior to trial, the filing of the counterclaim did not constitute a waiver of the Missouri statute. 08
The Saupe court's discussion of the California cases might be interpreted to mean that, under the right circumstances, the Missouri Dead Man's
Statute can be waived by counterclaim against the surviving party.
Because Ullery was distinguished in its facts rather than rejected outright,
the Saupe decision suggests that Ullery may be good precedent in situations where the protected party's counterclaim is not dismissed prior to trial.
Ullery, however, is not compatible with the Missouri Dead Man's Statute.
The Ullery rule should not be adopted in Missouri. Counterclaims should
not waive the Missouri Dead Man's Statute.
The Ullery decision was controlled by the express language of the
California Dead Man's statute. 10 9 The California statute (now repealed)
applied only to actions brought against an estate."10 In actions brought by
an executor or administrator, the survivor was competent to testify in his own
defense."1 The administrator's counterclaim in Ullery was an action
against the survivor. Ullery, therefore, was consistent with the California
statute in finding the survivor competent to testify in his defense to
the counterclaim.
Ullery, however, is not consistent with the Missouri Dead Man's Statute.
Unlike the California statute, the Missouri statute is not limited to suits
brought against the protected party. In Missouri, the decedent's estate has
the protection of the statute whether it be the plaintiff or defendant in a
lawsuit. The survivor's testimony can be excluded in a suit brought by the
protected party.1 2 If the Missouri statute is waived by the protected party's
counterclaim, waiver of the survivor's incompetency would depend on which
party won the race to the courthouse. 1 3 If the protected party files his action
107. 54 Cal. App.2d 82, 128 P.2d 566 (1942).
108. Saupe v. Kertz, - S.W.2d
,-

(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).

109. Code Am. 1880, c. 99, p. 112, § 1 (repealed 1967) stated that:
The following persons cannot be witnesses:

3.Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or
persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against
an executor or administrator on a claim, or demand against the estate of
a deceased person, as to any matter or fact occurring before the death
of such deceased person.
110. See Chadbourn, History and Interpretationof the California Dead Man
Statute: A Proposalfor Liberalization,4 U.C.L.A. LAw REv. 175, 186 (1956).

111. Sedgwick v. Sedgwick, 52 Cal. 836 (1877).

112. See, e.g., Davis v. Robb, 10 S.W.2d 680 (Spr. Mo. App. 1928).
113. This problem could be avoided, of course, by following the California
example and limiting the application of the Missouri Dead Man's Statute to
actions brought against the protected party. Such a limitation, however, would
substantially change the Dead Man's Statute waiver doctrine in Missouri.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/6
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first, he would be able to litigate his claim and still exclude the survivor's
testimony. Should the survivor file his action first, however, the protected

party could not counterclaim without waiving the statute. 114 Where his
counterclaim is compulsory, 15 the protected party would have to choose
between waiving the statute or losing his cause of action. Clearly, the Ullery
waiver-by-counterclaim rule would produce bad results. The admissibility
of the survivor's testimony should not turn on the order in which the parties'
claims are filed."16
The Ullery waiver-by-counterclaim rule should not be adopted in Missouri. The purpose of the Missouri Dead Man's Statute is to make the parties
substantially equal in their ability to produce evidence. 1 7 The protected
party gains no evidentiary advantage over the survivor by litigating a
counterclaim. Asserting a counterclaim has nothing to do with producing
evidence. A counterclaim should not constitute a waiver of the Missouri
Dead Man's Statute.

E. Waiver at Trial
1. Objections
The Dead Man's Statute does not make the survivor incompetent for
all purposes. The transactions proviso excludes only testimony which could
have been contradicted by the decedent had he lived, 1 8 and the administration proviso only excludes testimony on matters occurring prior to probate
or the appointment of the administrator." 9 If the survivor testifies on
subjects within the scope of his competency, the protected party has no
grounds for objection. 20 But where the survivor attempts to testify concerning excluded subjects, the protected party must make a proper 2and
timely objection to preserve his rights under the Dead Man's Statute.' '

114. Such a waiver rule would, therefore, render Mo. Sup. CT. 13. 55.32(b)
(1974), on permissive counterclaims ineffective in cases where the protected party
is the defendant.
115. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 55.32(a) (1974).
116. The scope of this waiver is uncertain. Under the California Dead Man
statute, the survivor would be competent only to defend against the counterclaim. Bruce v. Ullrey, 375 P.2d 883, 836, 25 Cal. Rptr. 841, 844 (1962). A
waiver of the Missouri Dead Man's statute, however, is for all purposes. See, e.g.,
Borgess Inv. Co. v. Vette, 142 Mo. 560, 44 S.W. 754 (1898).
117. See note 6 supra.
118. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
119. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
120. B.F. Goodrich Rubber Co. v. Bennett, 222 Mo. App. 510, 281 S.W. 75
K.C. Ct. App. 1926); C. E. Donnell Newspaper Co. v. Jung, 81 Mo. App. 577
St. L. Ct. App. 1899).
121. Birmingham v. Smith, 420 S.W.2d 514 (Mo. 1967); Carney v. Carney,
95 Mo. 353, 8 S.W. 729 (1888); Berry v. Hartzell, 91 Mo. 132, 3 S.W. 582
(1887); Oliver v. McFarland, 282 S.W. 735 (Spr. Mo. App. 1926); Belch v.
Roberts, 191 Mo. App. 243, 177 S.W. 1062 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915); Jones v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 173 Mo. App. 1, 155 S.W. 1106 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913); In re
Imboden's Estate, 111 Mo. App. 220, 86 S.W. 263 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905). See
also Sprague v. Sea, 152 Mo. 327, 53 S.W. 1074 (1899).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
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The objection must be in proper form. It must be specific enough to
inform the court of the incompetency of the witness. 12 Objections based
on grounds other than the Dead Man's Statute are ineffective.l12 The objection should refer to the Dead Man's Statute 2 4 and recite the facts necessary
to its operation. For example, where the survivor is disqualified under

Several cases suggest that where the court has made a clear, explicit ruling
that the survivor is competent to testify, the protected party can cease his objections without risk of waiver. Johnson v. Dur-Est, Inc., 224 S.W.2d 611 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1949); Poague v. Mallory, 208 Mo. App. 395, 235 S.W. 491 (K.C. Ct.
Ap. 1921). One case, Schwalbert v. Konert, 230 Mo. App. 811, 76 S.W.2d
445 (St. L. Ct. App. 1984), went so far as to hold that, where one defendant
was improperly allowed to testify over the protected party's objection, there was
no further need to object to the testimony of a similarly disqualified codefendant
(his wife), because it was apparent she had the same status under the statute.
It would be a safer practice, however, to continue objections and to object to
every incompetent witness.
122. Miller v. Gayman, 482 S.W.2d 414 (Mo. 1972); Birdsong v. Estate of
Ladwig 314 S.W.2d 471 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958). In Saupe v. Kertz, - S.W.2d
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974), an objection that
• . . the law under the Dead Man's Statute provides that where one
party to a transaction has been killed that the other party to that transaction is disqualified from testifying to those events and we would object
for that reason to any further testimony....
was held to be sufficient. Id. at
123. Elsea v. Smith, 202 S.W. 1071 (1918) (hearsay); Gerhardt v. Tucker,
187 Mo. 46, 85 S.W. 552 (1905) (privileged communication); Fellows v.
Farmer, 379 S.W.2d 842 (Spr. Mo. App. 1964) (irrelevant & immaterial); Birdsong v. Estate of Ladwig, 314 S.W.2d 471 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958) (irrelevant &
immaterial).
The objection must be directed to the competency of the witness, not the
subject matter of the testimony. An objection "to the offer of any testimony" was
properly overruled as going to the competency of the testimony rather than the
competency of the witness in People's Bank of Queen City v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 225 Mo. App. 1113, 1126, 40 S.W.2d 535, 542 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931). The
testimony itself may be relevant and competent to the lawsuit. It is the witness
who is incompetent to give the testimony. See also In re McMenamy's Guardianship, 307 Mo. 98, 270 S.W. 662 (1925).
124. Failure to refer to the statute in the objection by name may result in
waiver. In Mann v. Balfour, 187 Mo. 290, 86 S.W. 103 (1905), the defendant
made the following objection:
May it please the court, we object to this witness being introduced,
because she is incompetent, for the reason that she is an interested party.
The deceased is dead, and the heir at law-the other heir at law is dead,
and she is the only surviving heir, and, they being dead, she can not
testify against the interests of the one that is dead, and the will they seek
to establish takes from the heirs of the heir at law, that is, it takes the
property that belongs to the heir at law; takes it and gives it to this one
-this witness-under the will; and for that reason she is incompetent to
testify.
Id. at 299, 86 S.W. at 105. The court held that this objection was insufficient
because it was based merely on the witness' interest instead of her disqualification under the statute. A witness is not disqualified soley for interest. See text
accompanying notes 4, 5 supra. In Birdsong v. Estate of Ladwig, 314 S.W.2d 471
(Spr. Mo. App. 1958), the following objection was held insufficient for the same
reason: "We object to the testimony of this witness because of the relation between
him and the deceased." Id. at 474.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/6
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the administration proviso, the objection should state that an executor or
administrator is a party to the suit. An objection
failing to include this fact
1 25
may be held insufficient to prevent a waiver.
The objection must be,timely. A general objection to the competency
of the survivor at the outset of his testimony is ineffective. 126 In Birdsong v.
Estate of Ladwig,127 a suit for the value of personal services allegedly
rendered to decedent, plaintiff testifying in his own behalf gave his name
and address. Defendant then stated: "We object to any further testimony
on any matters to the claim or contract or any part of his claim because of
the fact that Edmund D. Ladwig is deceased and under the dead man's
statute this man can't testify."'.2 This objection was properly overruled as
premature and, overly broad because, although the administration proviso
excluded plaintiff's testimony as to events which occurred prior to the
probate of the will, plaintiff was competent to testify concerning subsequent
30
events.120 For similar reasons counsel is not allowed to carry an objection, 1
absent agreement by the opposing party or the court that the objection will
be treated as applicable to subsequent testimony.
The protected party has no right to allow what he considers to be
incompetent 'testimony to go without objection and then, upon discovering
that it is unfavorable, move for its exclusion.' 3 ' Failure to object to a few
specific answers made by an incompetent witness, however, does not necessarily waive the' survivor's incompetency. Thomas v. Fitzgeralds Estate'32
was a suit to recover for household services performed for the decedent.
The plaintiff took the stand in his own behalf and testified to his name, age,
and that he had lived with the deceased 10 years. Proper objection was 'then
made to the plintiff's subsequent testimony on the ground that the adninistration proviso made the plaintiff incompetent to testify concerning events
occurring prior to the probate of the decedents will. The plaintiff had
testified without'objettion on a matter within his incompetency, namely the
length of his iesidency ivith ihe deceased; nevertheless, the court found that
ons were timely and held that there had been .no
the subseque tJec
33
waiver of the. lisqualLfication.
125. Kneuven v. Berliner's Estate, 54 S.W.2d 494 (K.C. Mo. App. 1932).'.Cf.
Birdsong v. Estate of Ladwig, 314 S.W.2d 471 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).
126. Burgdorf v. Keeven, 351 Mo. 1072, 174 S.W.2d 816 (1943); Inre
McMenamy's Guardianship, 307 Mo. 98, 270 S.W. 662 (1925); Gantz v. American
-

National Bank; 420 S.W.2d 8 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); Fellows v. Farmer,
S.W.2d 842 (Spr. Mo. App. 1964); Deichman v. Aronoff, 296 S.W.2d 171
L. Mo. App. 1956); Schwalbert v. Konert, 230 Mo. App. 811, 76 S.W.2d
(St. L. Ct. App. 1934); B. F. Goodrich Rubber Co.v. Bennett, 222 Mo. App.

379
(St.

445
510,
281 S.W. 75 (K.C.Ct. App. 1926); Burns v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 187
S.W. 145 (St. L. Mo. App. 1916); Tremain v. Dyott, 161 Mo. App. 217, 142 S.W.
760 (Spr. Ct. App. 1912); Hall v. Smith, 149 Mo. App. 379, 130 S.W. 449 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1910). Cf. City of St. Joseph ex rel. Forsee v. Baker, 86 Mo. App. 310
(KG. Ct. App. 1900).
127. 314 S.W.2d 471 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).
128. Id. at 474.
129. Id. at 476.

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 476.
Mann v. Balfour, 187 Mo. 290, 304, 86 S.W. 103, 106 (1905).
297 S.W. 425 (Spr. Mo. App. 1927).
Id. at 428.
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Beyond a certain point, however, delay in objecting does constitute a
waiver. 134 Most reported cases involving delayed objections have resulted
in a waiver of the witness' incompetency. 35 Those cases where the court
has declined to find a waiver usually involved situations where the survivor answered only a few questions before a proper objection was made. 30
The trial court has some discretion in this area, but in general,
the objection
should be made at the earliest possible opportunity.'3 7
2. Cross Examination
When an incompetent witness is permitted to testify over the protected
party's proper and timely objection, the protected party has the right to
cross-examine the witness on the matters covered in the direct examination
without waiving his earlier objection. This is illustrated by Johnston v.
Johnston,13 8 a suit to establish a resulting trust of real property held by
plaintiffs" stepfather. Plaintiffs contended that the stepfather purchased the
land with their mother's money; as heirs of the mother, they claimed to have
inherited the land. Over the plaintiffs' objections, the trial court allowed the
stepfather to testify that the money in question was his money which he had
placed in the mother's custody for the purpose of purchasing the land.
Plaintiffs then cross-examined the stepfather as to his prior inconsistent
statement that the money had been the mother's savings. Judgment was
entered for the stepfather. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
stepfather was an incompetent witness under the transactions proviso to
testify as to his dealings with the mother. 3 9 The plaintiffs' cross-examination,
limited to matters contained in the examination-in-chief, did not waive
the disqualification.
Cross-examination of the survivor on matters not touched on in the direct
examination which are excludable under the statute, however, does waive
the incompetency of the survivor. 40 In Moore v. Adams' Estate,141 plaintiff
134. Upshaw v. Latham, 486 S.W.2d 656 (St. L. Mo. App. 1972) (20 ques-

tions prior to objection); State ex rel. Community Heat & A. C. Co. v. Schwartz,

452 S.W.2d 243 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970) (testified in detail); In re Reichelts

Estate, 179 S.W.2d 119 (St. L. Mo. App. 1944) (testified at length); Norvell v.
Cooper, 155 Mo. App. 445, 134 S.W. 1095 (St. L. Ct. App. 1911) (considerable

progress in testimony).

135. Cases cited note 184 supra, note 187 infra.
136. Kneuven v. Berliner's Estate, 54 S.W.2d 494 (K.C. Mo. App. 1982)

(three questions); Thomas v. Fitzgerald's Estate, 297 S.W. 425 (Spr. Mo. App.

1927) (one question). Cf. Stuyvaert v. Arnold, 122 Mo. App. 421, 99 S.W. 529

(St. L. Ct. App. 1907).
187. In re Reichelt's Estate, 179 S.W.2d 119 (St. L. Mo. App. 1944); People's
Bank of Queen City v. Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co., 225 Mo. App. 1118, 40 S.W.2d 535
(K.C. Ct. App. 1931); Markowitz v. Markowitz, 290 S.W. 119 (K.C. Mo. App.

1927).

138. 173 Mo. 91, 73 S.W. 202 (1903).
139. Id. at 121, 78 S.W. at 211.
140. Moore v. Adams' Estate, 303 S.W.2d 936 (Mo. 1957); Hegger v.
Kausler, 303 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1957); McCune v. Goodwillie, 204 Mo. 306, 102
S.W. 997 (1907); Simmon v. Marion, 227 S.W.2d 127 (K.C. Mo. App. 1950);
Johnson v. Dur-Est, Inc., 224 S.W.2d 611 (K.C. Mo. App. 1949); Bussen v. Del
Commune, 199 S.W.2d 13 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947). Cf. Lohnes v. Baker, 156 Mo.
App. 397, 187 S.W. 282 (Spr. Ct. App. 1911).
141. 808 S.W.2d 936 (Mo. 1957).
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sued to recover the value of labor allegedly performed in repairing the
decedents property pursuant to an oral contract with decedent. Plaintiff
took the stand in his own behalf at trial, but defendant's objections under
the administration proviso limited plaintiffs direct testimony to identification of himself and certain books of account. On cross-examination, however,
the defendant examined the plaintiff as to the type of repairs made and his
agreement with the deceased. The court held that the defendant had thereby
142
waived the statutory disqualification.
The waiver arising from cross-examination does not make the survivor
competent to testify for all purposes, but extends only to the new matters
1 43
covered in the cross-examination.
3. Direct Examination
If the protected party makes the survivor his own witness and elicits
testimony which could have been excluded under the Dead Man's Statute,
he waives the survivor's disqualification. 4 4 This rule serves to prevent the
protected party from eliciting only favorable testimony. Once any portion
of the survivor's excludable testimony is offered as evidence, fairness requires
that he be permitted to tell his whole story.145 The waiver makes the survivor
46
competent for all purposes.1
There is no reported case in Missouri involving a direct examination of
the survivor by the protected party which touched only matters on which
the survivor was competent to testify. Whether this waives the statute is
still an open question. In several cases where direct examination of the
survivor did touch matters excludable under the statute, the general waiver
rule was stated without any mention of a subject matter requirement. 47 One
case stated that the statute was inapplicable where the survivor is called as

142. Id. at 989.
148. Cases cited note 140 supra. An older line of cases now rejected in Missouri held that cross-examination on new matters made the survivor competent for
all purposes. See, e.g., Rauch v. Metz, 212 S.W. 857 (Mo. 1919); Reitz v.
O'Neil, 2 S.W.2d 178 (St. L. Mo. App. 1928).
144. In re Trautmann's Estate, 800 Mo. 314, 254 S.W. 286 (1923).
145. Id. at 322, 254 S.W. at 288.
146. In re Trautmann's Estate, 300 Mo. 814, 254 S.W. 286 (1923); Strode v.
Frommeyer, 115 Mo. A pp. 220, 91 S.W. 167 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905). This waiver
may also extend to other disqualified witnesses. The taking of one survivor's
deposition or use of his prior recorded testimony waives the incompetency of all
other similarly situated, disqualified witnesses. Martin v. Norton, 497 S.W.2d 164
(Mo. 1973) prior recorded testimony); Baker v. Baker, 363 Mo. 318, 251 S.W.2d
81 (1952) ( eposition).
147. Starks v. Lincoln, 316 Mo. 483, 291 S.W. 132 (1927); Strode v. Frommeyer, 115 Mo. App. 220, 91 S.W. 167 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905); Tucker v. Gentry,
98 Mo. App. 655, 67 S.W. 723 (K.C. Ct. App. 1902). Cf. Ashley v. Williams, 365
Mo. 286, 281 S.W.2d 875 (1955); F. Hattersley Brokerage & Comm. Co. v. Hume,
193 Mo. App. 120, 182 S.W. 93 (St. L. Ct. App. 1916); Hoehn v. Struttman, 71
Mo. App. 399 (St. L. Ct. App. 1897).
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a witneiss by the other side. 148 Such a construction of the waiver rule, howevt, would frequently cause the protected party to forego calling the
survivor as a witness for any purpose, rather than waive the survivor's
incompetency. As a result, the protected party would be denied the use of
a portion of the survivor's testimony, even though it is not excludable by
the'statute.
The protected party should be allowed to examine the survivor on matters not excludable under the statute without waiving his incompetency.1 49
The aim of the statute is to put the parties on an equality.150 This would be
more fully accomplished by allowing both parties an equal opportunity to
obtain testimony from all witnesses competent to testify on the matters in
issue. The recent case of Saupe v. Kertz held that an administrator's motion
to produce dbuments-did not waive the statute where the subject matter
of the information contained in the requested documents was not excludable
under the statute.' 0 ' This principle should carry over to waiver by direct
examination. Because Missouri has no definite case on this subject, however,
the protected party's direct examination of the survivor may waive the
statute regardless of the subject matter of the direct examination.
F. 'Waiver Arising From A Prior Trial
A waiver'of incompetency made, in whatever manner, at one stage of
the trial is a wvaivef during the entire proceeding. 152 The waiver extends to
.another trial of th6 same cause, a trial de novo, and to subsequent proceed1ig generally b6t0en the parties on the same cause of action.153 As Causer

148. C6nrey v."Pratt, 248 Mo. 576, 587, 154 S.W. 749, 752 (1913). The
court's statement cannot be taken literally. If the statute does not apply at all, the
common law disqualification for interest would make the witness incompetent.
The court must have meant that the transactions proviso of the statute is inapplicable where the survivor is called as a witness by the protected party.
149. Presumably, if the survivor is reliable for the purposes for which the
protected party calls him, he is reliable for all purposes.
150. Ess v. Giffith, 139 Mo. 322, 40 S.W. 930 (1897).
151. Saupe v. Kertz, S.W.2d ,(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
152. Ess v. Griffith, 189 Mo. 322, 40 S.W. 930 (1897).
153. Edwards v. Durham, 346 S.W.2d 90, 99 (Mo. 1961). Where, for
example, the protected'party has called the survivor as his witness in probate,
the resulting waiver will carry over making the survivor a competent witness in
a circuit court trial de novo. Morley v. Prendiville, 316 Mo. 1094, 295 S.W. 563
(1927); Starks v. Lincoln, 316 Mo. 483, 291 S.W. 132 (1927); In re McMenamy's
Guardianship, 307-Mo. 98, 270 S.W. 662 (1925); In re Trautmanns Estate, 300
Mo. 314, 254 S.W. 286 (1923); F. Hattersley Brokerage & Comm. Co. v. Hume,
193 Mo. App. 120, 182 S.W. 93 (St. L. Ct. App. 1916); Hoehn v. Struttman, 71
Mo. App. 399 (St. L. Ct. App. 1897). The source of the waiver is irrelevant. It
could originate in the taking of the survivor's discovery deposition in connection
with lower court proceedings. Edwards v. Durham, 346 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1961);
In re Imboden's Estate, 111 Mo. App. 220, 86 S.W. 263 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
It can also arise from the earlier trial itself through a failure to make proper
objection to the survivor's direct testimony. Oliver v. McFarland, 282 S.W. 735
(Spr. Mo.jApp. 1926); Belch v. Roberts, 191 Mo. App. 243, 177 S.W. 1062
(K.C. Ct. App. 1915); Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co., 173 Mo. App. 1, 155 S.W.
1106 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913); Norvell v. Cooper, 155 Mo. App. 445, 134 S.W.
1095 (St. L. Ct. App. 1911). Cf. Lang v. Wishart, 217 Mo. App. 119, 273 S.W.
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v. Wilmoth 5 4 indicates, however, the waiver does not extend to a different
suit between the same parties. There an executor sued to establish a vendor's
lien on certain real property. In an earlier suit to cancel a deed to the same
property for reasons of mistake, the executor's decedent had taken the
defendant's deposition, and the executor had used parts of it at the trial. The
decedent had died before the earlier case went to trial. The defendant
contended that the use of the deposition in the prior suit should carry over
to waive his incompetency in the current litigation. Causer held that there
was no waiver because
the earlier suit involved a different cause of action
155
and different issues.
For the waiver to carry over there must also be an identity of parties
between the two suits, even though both involve the same subject matter.
5 6 an executor sued to recover money
In Edwards v. Durham,E
the decedent
allegedly had loaned to defendant. Defendant argued that the executor's
conduct in a prior lawsuit waived the defendant's incompetency. The prior
lawsuit was brought by the defendant against McDonald, a residuary
legatee of the estate, to establish a resulting trust covering property in the
estate. The executor had been McDonald's attorney in the prior lawsuit
and had taken the defendant's deposition, parts of which were relevant to
the transactions at issue in the present suit to recover the loan. The defendant contended that the prior waiver carried over to waive his incompetency
in the present litigation. The court however, held that there was no waiver
because, although the executor acted as counsel in the prior suit, he had
not been a party either personally or in his representative capacity. 57 Nor
was he acting as McDonald's representative in the present suit.158 The relationship between the residuary legatee of an estate and the executor of that
estate was not sufficiently close to make McDonald's taking of the deposition
in the prior suit binding on the executor in the later litigation. 59 The defendant remained incompetent under the administration proviso to testify about
transactions occurring prior to the probate of the decedents will. 60 The

768 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925) (no waiver where protected party not present in
probate to object to the survivor's testimony). Or in cross-examination of the
survivor. Moore v. Adams' Estate, 303 S.W.2d 936 (Mo. 1957); Markowitz v.
Markowitz, 290 S.W. 119 (K.C. Mo. App. 1927); Tierney v. Hannon's Ex'r, 81
Mo. App. 488 (St. L. Ct. App. 1899). Cf. Meffert v. Lawson, 315 Mo. 1091, 287
S.W. 610 (1926); Ables v. Ackley, 133 Mo. App. 594, 113 S.W. 698 (K.C.
Ct.A pp. 1908).
154. 142 S.W.2d 777 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940).
155. Id. at 780. Causer involved two suits having different causes of action.
Where the same cause of action and issues are involved, it is still an open question whether taking a survivor's deposition while both original parties are alive
will, on the death of the other party, be a waiver of the statute binding on the
decedents executor.
156. 846 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1961). See also Crow v. Crow, 124 Mo. 120, 100
S.W. 1123 (St. L. Ct. App. 1907) (one additional party added).
157. Edwards v. Durham, 346 S.W.2d 90, 99 (Mo. 1961).
158. Id. at 100.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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waiver did not carry over from the prior suit because there was no identity
of parties.
If the protected party actually uses the survivor's recorded testimony
from a prior trial in a later trial, there is a waiver. 6 ' In addition, use of the
survivor's prior testimony in connection with a motion for summary judgment
can also result in a waiver. The court found such a waiver in Prentzler v.
Schneider.1 62 Prentzlerwas a wrongful death action arising out of a highway
collision in which both drivers were killed. Mrs. Prentzler, a passenger in
one of the cars, brought the suit to recover for the wrongful death of her
husband against the estate of Mr. Schneider, the driver of the other vehicle
involved in the accident. Mrs. Prenzler was barred under the transactions
proviso from testifying concerning the accident because Mr. Schneider
could have contradicted her version of the accident had he lived. The defendant administratrix, Mrs. Schneider, moved for summary judgment. In
support of her motion Mrs. Schneider offered the transcript of a prior trial
wherein Mrs. Schneider had sued the estate of Mr. Prentzler to recover for
the wrongful death of her husband. The transcript contained Mrs. Prenzler's
testimony concerning the fatal accident. The court held that this use of Mrs.
Prentzler's prior testimony in conjunction with the motion for summary
judgment waived the Dead Man's Statute,1' and Mrs. Prenzler became
64
competent as a general witness in the case.
IV.

CoNcrusiON

The Missouri Dead Man's Statute was enacted to protect estates from
false claims based on uncontradicted, perjured testimony. 16 5 The living and
the dead were to be placed in substantial equality by excluding the testimony of the living party.16 6 Instead of achieving equality, however, the
statute frequently gave an unfair advantage to the decedents representatives. Exclusion of the survivor's testimony often prevented recovery on

161. Martin v. Norton, 497 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. 1973); Lampe v. Franklin
American Trust Co., 839 Mo. 361, 96 S.W.2d 710 (1936). Cf. Central Bank of
Kansas City v. Thayer, 184 Mo. 61, 82 S.W. 142 (1904); In re Whitlow's Estate,
184 Mo. App. 229, 167 S.W. 463 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913) (no waiver where report
containing survivor's prior testimony was used to establish res judicata.)
The cases seem to imply that the prior recorded testimony must touch on
matters within the survivor's incompetency for a waiver to occur. See Lampe v.
Franklin American Trust Co., 839 Mo. 361, 96 S.W.2d 710 (1936), where the

court stated: "We, therefore hold that, by offering plaintiff's former testimony

(about the transaction here at issue) as evidence in this case, at the first trial
thereof, defendants have waived his competency herein as a witness as to the
whole of the transaction." Id. at 373, 96 S.W.2d at 716 (emphasis added).
162. 411 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. En Banc 1966).
163. Id. at 142. Judge Finch's dissent criticized the majority opinion for
confronting the protected party with a Hobson's choice in deciding whether to
utilize summary judgment procedure. See Morgan, Dead Man's Statute-Waiver
of Incompetency, 32 Mo. L. REv. 397 (1967).
164. Id. at- 142. See also Lampe v. Franklin American Trust Co., 339 Mo. 361
at 373, 96 S.W.2d 710 at 716 (1936).
165. See note 6 supra.
166. See note 6 supra.
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legitimate claims. In an attempt to mitigate hardships arising under the
statute, the courts developed an extensive doctrine of waiver. This has further
complicated the statute and created pitfalls for the unwary litigant.167
A judicially imposed doctrine of waiver is not the proper solution to
the problems caused by the Missouri Dead Man's Statute. If the Dead
Man's Statute produces inequitable results, the statute should itself be
modified. Protection of estates does not require an inflexible disqualification
of the living. Many jurisdictions have no dead man's statute.' 68 If estates
do require additional protection, several alternate safeguards are available.16 9 Until statutory reform comes, however, it will remain a matte -of
practical importance to be fiully aware of the waiver problems associated
with the Dead Man's Statute.
HowD S. Basrmop Jn.

167. See, e.g., Prentzler v. Schneider, 41 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. En Banc 1966).
168, E.g., California.,
169. The trial court may be given discretion to admit, the survivor's testimony
if it is sufficiently credible and important. See, e.g., Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN: § 122251 (1956). Another alternative permits the survivor totestify,-'but provides
that his testimony will not support a judgment unless corroborated by other
evidence. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-5 (1958). A third variation admits
not only, the survivor's testimony, but also any writings of the deceased or evidence
of the deceased's oral statements bearing on the controversy., Se, e:g., N.H-.REV.
STAT. ANN. § 516:25 (1958). See also C. McCouvimc, EVIDENCE § 65" (2nd ed.
1972); Ray, Dead Man's Statutes, 24 OHIO ST.L.J. 89 (1968).
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